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In the last decade the international situation has been marked on the one 
hand by refugee crisis, and on the other by right-wing populist reaction 
to it. This constellation forces a new playground for the traditional philo-
sophical cosmopolitan–nationalist debate. The moral and political issues 
raised in this new context concern duties to “strangers at our doors”, and 
these duties and the awareness of them are the fi rst step in a cosmopolitan 
but realistic direction. Cosmopolitanism now has to start as “samaritan” 
cosmopolitanism, openness to and engagement for the close and present 
strangers. Once the present urgent problems are on the way to be solved, 
we should turn our attention to deeper causes of the crisis. These causes 
are the evils traditionally discussed by cosmopolitan authors, from dra-
matic North-South inequalities, to exploitation and warmongering done 
by the richest countries. The initial samaritan motivation naturally 
leads to attention to deeper issues, and toward a more ideal cosmopolitan 
theory. The resulting Samaritan-to-deeper-measures model fi ts well with 
Ypi’s engagement with the principle/activism divide, and offers a way 
of understanding, and hopefully, overcoming it. At the meta-level it con-
nects the appeal to empathy as the relevant moral sentiment and the more 
rationalist, contractualist justifi cation of global justice.
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1. Introduction
The topics of cosmopolitanism and the issues tied to cosmopolitanism 
in practice, to which this paper is dedicated, are topics on which Lea 
Ypi has been working for decades, and that are addressed in her origi-
nal and challenging book on global justice (Ypi 2012), her (co-) edited 
volume on migration (Fine and Ypi 2016), and in a series of papers. 
Some issues are also connected to the more general theoretical con-
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trasts, like the one between the ideal and non-ideal theory and the like 
(some addressed in the book presented in Rijeka in 2018 by Jonathan 
White and Ypi (2016)).1
What shall we mean by “cosmopolitanism”? In her book, Ypi dis-
cusses “[t]he shift in the use of the term ‘cosmopolitanism’ from an as-
sociated with the conduct of single individuals to a politically relevant 
interpretation of justice” (2012: 27). She characterizes cosmopolitan-
ism as focusing upon global distributive equality (2012: 104). This core 
idea belongs to “political” cosmopolitanism (as described, for instance, 
in Stanford Encyclopedia entry and sources mentioned there). But the 
tone of Ypi’s book suggests a strong moral motivation, and thus a link 
with “moral cosmopolitanism”, which I shall assume in the sequel.
Of course, I am aware there are a lot of problems that arise for 
cosmopolitanism, the ones that has been formulated by its critics. For 
instance, Miller proposes a dilemma for cosmopolitans:
So cosmopolitanism as a moral outlook seems to be profoundly ambiguous. 
In its strong form it readily excludes any preference for one’s compatriots, 
but by simultaneously ruling out other forms of partiality that are integral 
to a worthwhile human life, it becomes hard to accept. In its weak form, 
by contrast, it reduces to a broad humanitarianism that does not rule out 
anything much at all beyond repugnant ideologies that regard some human 
lives as of no value. The interesting question is whether we can fi nd some 
intermediate view. (Miller 2016: 24)
Ypi has an answer: Distinguish the level of principles and the level of 
action, the ideal and the non-ideal. The ideal (and principles) is the 
right level for cosmopolitanism. But how shall we connect the two? I 
think I have an answer to suggest that agrees with Ypi’s distinction 
of levels, but stresses the possibility of passage from one to the other.
In order to introduce my proposal, I shall start from the fact that 
a new playground has been opened for and made obligatory to cosmo-
politan refl ection. A few decades ago philosophers were writing about 
post-communist confl icts going all the way into wars (like the post-Yu-
goslav one) and international penal justice applying to the war crimes 
(Hague and Rome above all), and about the cosmopolitan promises of 
supra-national bodies, like the EU. The hope in a relatively egalitarian 
liberalism was in the air.
Now, the most urgent problems are different. On the side of human 
suffering, it is immigrants and refugees in general that are in focus. 
On the opposite side, the one of rejection and national-cultural egoism 
one encounters the mass success of populism. Someone might object 
that the problematics of wars is still alive, and indeed in a dramatic 
form, say in the Middle East, from Mediterranean to Afghanistan, and 
that the idea of an allegedly new playground is part of a myopic West-
ern perspective. (A follower of Ingram’s more pessimistic moments, e.g. 
(2013: 18), might argue for such an objection.) If this is the case, please 
1 Thanks go to Lea Ypi and to the organizers of the conference, Elvio Baccarini 
and Ivan Cerovac.
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relativize the formulation “the new playground” into “the new play-
ground-for-us”, countries where the analytic political-philosophical dis-
cussion is going on.
My proposal starts from trans-national, and in this sense cosmo-
politan interaction, the activity of helping strangers, refuges, immi-
grants in general. I shall borrow from J. Waldron the metaphor of the 
Good Samaritan, who helps the suffering individual not belonging to 
his tribe:
We tend to think carelessly that the moral functions of the state must be 
easier to explain on an affi nity model. But this is not the case. The most 
demanding moral requirements are those that insist on our taking care of 
strangers and doing justice to those with whom we are not already bound by 
ties of kinship. (Waldron 2011)
The key here to all this—in the rescue cases—is something like prox-
imity, the persons in question being there, on the spot: “[A] certain 
Samaritan, as he journeyed, came where he was” (Waldron 2000: 
1075). This all sounded strange, at least to me in 2000, when I read 
Waldron; suddenly, with the immigration crisis and the populist explo-
sion, it became most realistic and actual (see also Waldron 2011 and 
Valentini 2015). The Good Samaritan is the right intermediate fi gure, 
connecting the local and the cosmopolitan.
So, I see good samaritanism as a variant of cosmopolitanism (or 
as its closest ally). More importantly, it is the variant (or ally) that is 
crucial in the times of populist explosion. It takes us from the local to 
the universal, and merges principles and practice in a constructive way. 
The road to take is from samaritanism to deeper cosmopolitan mea-
sures. So, my framework here is the issue of cosmopolitanism in the 
populist age, but towards the end of the paper, I shall pass to the more 
standard variants of cosmopolitanism, where I agree with Ypi a lot.
Here is then the preview. The fi rst sub-section of the next section 
introduces populism—the relatively new player, focuses upon its right-
wing variety and briefl y discusses what it is and how it functions, con-
necting it very briefl y to issues of nationalism and communitarianism. 
The second sub-section turns to a crucial example: Immigration and 
immigrants, and the populist challenge of the refusal of potential im-
migrants, focusing on the work of David Miller as the opponent and 
philosophical guide to the problems. The second section is dedicated 
to the proposal for a cosmopolitan solution, to be called “the Samar-
itan-to-deeper-measures model”. It contains two parts, fi rst, the one 
concerning immediate Samaritan duties, here-and-now, the project of 
Samaritan cosmopolitanism. The second part turns to deeper causes of 
the migration disaster, and briefl y mentions the standard longer-term 
cosmopolitan solutions in terms of peace and distributive justice, which 
brings us back to Ypi and her two level picture. We propose to combine 
it with a two level view of justifi cation, combining fi tting sentiments, 
like empathy, at the basic level and rational contractualist justifi ca-
tion at the higher, more theoretical level. Finally, the conclusion sum-
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marizes the issues awaiting those who deal with cosmopolitanism in 
practice, either through activism, or through refl ection of both.
2. The new playground
2.1 Populism
The present day populism is a relatively new anti-cosmopolitan po-
litical machine, a spectre, to quote Gellner and Ionescu: “A spectre is 
haunting Europe—the spectre of populism.” (Gellner and Ionescu 1969: 
1). Leaders like Orban, Trump, Erdogan and their likes are to a large 
extent shaping the global situation; together with the refugee crisis, 
populism is determining the new playground that is surrounding us. 
But, how should we think of it? What is it, in the fi rst place?
The fi rst thing to note about the notion of populism is that it is very 
thin. It covers all sorts of movements and ideologies suspicious towards 
elites and friendly to the wide masses of “people”. Margaret Canovan, 
in her 1981 book Populism, has suggested seven different “types” di-
vided into two major categories:
Agrarian Populism
1. Farmers’ radicalism (e.g., the U.S. People’s Party)
2. Peasant movements (e.g., the East European Green Rising)
3. Intellectual agrarian socialism (e.g., the Narodniki in Russia)
Political Populism
4. Populist dictatorship (e.g., Peron)
5. Populist democracy (i.e., calls for referendums and “parti cipation”) 
6. Reactionary populism (e.g., George Wallace and his followers)
7. Politicians’ populism (e.g., broad, non-ideological coalition-build-
ing that draws on the unifi catory appeal of “the people”).
As noted by authors like Cass Mudde:
Populism is understood as a thin-centered ideology that considers society 
to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, 
“the pure people” versus “the corrupt elite,” and which argues that politics 
should be an expression of the volonté générale (general will) of the People. 
(Mudde 2007: 23, see also Mueller 2016)
What this richness and variations in Canovan’s taxonomy, read togeth-
er with Mudde’s and Mueller’s characterizations, suggest is that popu-
lism is probably not a political kind, the concept is too thin, plus vague 
and general. Right-wing populism is, in contrast, a political kind (as 
is, probably, its left-wing counterpart, which we shall not need to dis-
cuss here).2 So, let us concentrate upon right-wing populism, the only 
one relevant for our topic. Right-wing populism is exclusively focused 
upon one’s community. But the question is, which one? What about 
nationalism? Is the relevant community the national one, as Taguieff 
2 But see, for example, the chapter on “Leftist populism” (chapter six) of March 
(2011), Aslanidis (2017), and Ingram (2017).
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(2015) would have it? Interestingly, in the US populism is more like 
pro-American nationalism or patriotism, while in Europe, it is typically 
concentrated upon wider belonging, like belonging to Christian civili-
zation in contrast with the Muslim one, and the like.
Let me illustrate. Start from the US populism. Randall Curren 
(Forthcoming) gives a depressing overview. He notes that the leading 
populist activist groups, like the Tea Party, are “composed of people 
who believe that the government is plotting to deprive Americans of 
their liberties” (2019: 38–39). “Intensely focused on the federal govern-
ment as its chief enemy, the Patriot movement swelled when the na-
tion was led by a black man suspected of being a foreign-born Muslim 
and worse” (39). Its militia groups have engaged in armed standoffs 
with federal authorities and contested federal control of public lands. 
Its brand of patriotism is focused on the gun rights and the like, he 
remarks. He talks about Trump’s “pluto-populism” and concludes by 
noting the following:
This chapter has argued that expressions of patriotism in the USA following 
the attacks of September 11, 2001, differed in ways that refl ected preexist-
ing social, political, and religious divisions. These revolved around the role 
of Christian fundamentalism and theological variants of it that infl uenced 
the Bush administration’s response to 9.11, the role of Southern region-
alism and race in shaping US policy and citizenship, and the reactionary 
movements and economic polarization that set the stage for the emergence 
of populism in both the USA and Europe following the fi nancial collapse 
of 2008. The events of 9.11 are identifi ed as a landmark within larger 
overlapping periods in which reactionary fundamentalist and libertarian 
movements have emerged, together with the declining economic fortunes 
of Western societies, waves of immigration, and declining trust in public 
institutions. (Curren forthcoming: 38–39)
Overgeneralizing from some nationalistic features of some populist 
movements, authors like Taguieff (2017) conclude that populism is just 
a manifestation of nationalism, its “vengeance” for phenomena of glo-
balization, as he puts it in the introduction to his book. Benjamin De 
Cleen in his “Populism and nationalism” quotes earlier analogous pro-
posals. He notes that Stewart (1969: 183) “goes as far as” to call popu-
lism “a kind of nationalism”. And he lists other examples (Akkerman 
2003: 151, Jansen 2011 and Taguieff 1997: 15). He then explains why 
this strategy is wrong, why populism is not nationalism:
Populism is a discourse centred around the nodal points ‘the people’ and 
‘the elite’, in which the meaning of ‘the people’ and ‘the elite’ is constructed 
through a down/up antagonism between ‘the people’ as a large powerless 
group and ‘the elite’ as a small and illegitimately powerful group. Populism 
is a claim to represent ‘the people’ against a (some) illegitimate ‘elite’, and 
constructs it political demands as representing the will of ‘the people’ (for 
similar defi nitions see Laclau 2005a, 2005b; Stavrakakis 2004, Stavrakakis 
and Katsambekis 2014). (Rovira Kaltwasser et. al. 2017: 309)
Let me add that one can note that populist parties like German AfD 
primarily stress the alleged “civilizational” contrasts and then connect 
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them to more patriotic or nationalist slogans. A typical poster for Fed-
eral elections (in this case those that were held in Germany in Septem-
ber 2017) show young women in bikinis, with the simple text: “Burkas? 
We are for bikinis.” At the bottom, comes the more patriotic encourage-
ment: “Germany, h ave confi dence in yourself!” Other typical posters 
refer to alcohol drinks: We are not like Muslims, we love brandy, local 
wine and the like. And again “Germany, have confi dence in yourself!”
So, if populism can be wider than nationalism, although connected 
with it, how should we characterize it? Harald Stelzer has been stress-
ing common elements of communitarianism and populism, and I agree 
with him. He talks about criticism of modernization processes (involv-
ing alleged dissolution of communities, of embedded individual identity 
in the community and then moral chaos, all this critique imbedded in 
a criticism of liberal understanding of democracy). He next lists in-
stitutional orientation (involving emphasis on participation, demand-
ing solidarity and social order). Finally, there is the assumption of the 
homogeneity of collectives (with fear of cultural dissolution, cultural 
particularism and the shared notion of the good).3
This does not make right wing populism into communitarianism, 
since communitarianism is primarily a philosophical standpoint, not 
political movement. For populist attitude we need a related but not 
synonymous term, more tied to politics than to philosophy. Call it “com-
munitarian loyalty” or “strong communitarian loyalty” if you prefer.
So, cosmopolitanism is confronting new problems in the populist 
age marked by migration crisis and the like. It makes us aware of 
problems with classical cosmopolitan answer. The ideas of global gov-
ernance, global economic justice and global justice in general do not 
speak to the burning issues of the populist age. Cosmopolitanism faces 
this new playground and the populist challenge. How should we react 
to it? The crucial example is immigration and immigrants, the favorite 
topic of population urging.
2.2 Immigration
In Europe immigration is probably the main topic of populist uproar. In 
the US it is one the main topics. So, immigration plus populist reaction 
are at this moment the main testing ground for cosmopolitan views. 
Let me start very briefl y (with apologies) with anti-cosmopolitan pro-
national side, pointing to my disagreements along the way.
Some authors, on the moderate pro-national side, like David Mill-
er (particularly in his 2016), claim that national responsibility to ac-
cept immigrant refugees is balanced by considerations of the interest 
of would-be immigrants and the interests that national communities 
have in maintaining control over their own composition and character. 
But in fact, his reservations are much stronger. In discussing outcome 
3 Harald Stelzer, “Communitarianism and right wing populism”, a talk on 
conference in Bled, Slovenia. I thank Harald for sending me his powerpoint.
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obligations to the poor, Miller reminds the reader of possible respon-
sibilities of the “people in poor countries who support or acquiesce in 
regimes that reproduce poverty by siphoning off a large portion of GDP 
into military expenditure, presidential palaces, and Swiss bank ac-
counts” (Miller Undated: 6).
How seriously should we take this? Take Ghana, mentioned by Mill-
er in the same paper. Its actual GDP per capita is 4.604 US dollars, and 
it is on the 126th place on the list of countries. Imagine two women from 
Ghana, one from agricultural, the other from working class family, who 
migrate with their families to your country. “Sorry ladies, you are co-
responsible for corruption of your government. You have acquiesced 
in a regime that reproduces poverty, that’s the sad fact. So, you merit 
no help”, you are supposed to argue, from your comfortable seat in the 
park of Nuffi eld college. I just cannot believe that Miller would really 
suggest such a reaction.
He admits that “[...] there may indeed be some refugees to whom 
redress is owed” but points to the danger “of double bind” (Miller 2016: 
176): on the one hand, Western powers are blamed for their interven-
tion, on the other, blamed if they don’t intervene.
In any case, he is convinced of the irrelevance of cosmopolitanism:
In Chapter 2, I discuss cosmopolitanism in general terms as a background 
to the debate over immigration. Here I simply want to indicate why, even 
if one is convinced by the general arguments in its favor, it may be less 
helpful than one might suppose in thinking about the practice of immigra-
tion, where this involves not only the question “should borders be open or 
closed?” but a much wider set of issues about the selection of immigrants, 
the treatment of refugees, integration policy, and so forth. Thinking about 
cosmopolitan approaches is, however, a good way of focusing on the question 
of what we should take as given and what we should regard as amenable to 
change when discussing immigration. How realistic or idealistic should we 
be? For example, should we take for granted a world made up of separate 
states in the fi rst place? Should we assume that global inequalities will be 
roughly as large as they are now? How else might the current international 
order be changed?
The argument for swallowing a considerable dose of realism here is simply 
that the immigration issue would either disappear altogether or at least 
become much less pressing in a world that was confi gured quite differently 
from our own. Suppose there were no separate states, but simply admin-
istrative districts accountable to a world government of some sort. There 
would then be no immigration in the sense in which we understand it. (Mill-
er 2016: 16–17)
Miller very reasonably notes that steps have to be taken to reduce the 
migrant fl ows themselves to manageable proportions. He suggests 
that: “[T]his is partly a matter of working with local authorities in the 
sending states to clamp down on people-smuggling operations, and to 
better police their own territorial waters (this is most relevant in the 
case of states such as Turkey which are themselves safe havens for 
refugees), and partly a matter of improving living conditions and pro-
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viding work opportunities around the camps already established near 
confl ict zones” (2016: 272).
...[T]he refugee issue was likely to prove morally excruciating under certain 
circumstances, and the European crisis appears to confi rm that prophecy. 
No humanitarian could fail to respond to the plight of drowning boat people, 
or of land migrants who fi nd themselves blocked by border fences and with-
out basic means of subsistence. They are the hikers in the desert from my 
second chapter. But equally a co-ordinated response by states to the crisis 
must consider the longer-term consequences of what is now done—the sig-
nals it gives and the incentives it creates for those who might want to move 
in the future. And where states have developed (justifi ed) policies for dif-
ferent categories of immigrants—refugees, economic migrants, temporary 
workers, and so forth—these policies should not be torn to shreds because of 
the current emergency. Citizens and government offi cials alike have to fi nd 
a way of compromising between these two imperatives: how to rescue those 
in need of rescue without turning the border into a free-for-all? (2016: 172)
An urgent question, however, is how this is to be done. Nowadays, if you 
stop the smugglers, people in the threatened countries will be killed, 
or raped, or enslaved. So what about alternatives to smuggling? How 
about us making escape easier by organizing transportation for them? 
On the pro-refugee side, Kymlicka has been stressing the advan-
tages of the host state being multi-cultural, offering Canada as his 
prime example. He is rightly enthusiastic about cultures meeting each 
other, but also wants to save national solidarity, as against „ neoliberal 
multiculturalism”. He sees it as “ a progressive political resource”. So, 
wishing at the same time to save “immigration and multiculturalism” 
he tries “to identify the prospects for a multicultural national solidar-
ity” (Kymlicka 2015: 3). Here is his advice:
we need to develop a form of multiculturalism that is tied to an ethic of 
social membership: that is, a form of multiculturalism that enables immi-
grants to express their culture and identity as modes of participating and 
contributing to the national society. A solidarity-promoting multicultural-
ism would start from the premise that one way to be a proud and loyal Ca-
nadian is to be a proud Greek-Canadian or Vietnamese-Canadian, and that 
the activities of one’s group—be they religious, cultural, recreational, eco-
nomic or political—are understood as forms of belonging, and of investing 
in society, not only or primarily in the economic sense, but in a deeper social 
sense, even (dare I say it?) as a form of nation-building. (Kymlicka 2015: 12)
I fi nd the advice correct and convincing, but unfortunately, the main 
populism infected (or at least under such threat) European states are 
far from being multicultural to the extent typical of immigrant countries 
like Canada. We need a workable cosmopolitan political philosophy of 
immigration. So, let us go back to the main issue. Miller has been argu-
ing that cosmopolitan arrangement is too distant and far away to point in 
the direction of actual practice. So, what should (we) cosmopolitans do?
Ypi has one answer: The contrast between ideal and non-ideal. I 
would, for my own part, like to ask the question whether the here-
and-now approach could solve it: the immediacy of sight and mutual 
recognition is the main point, as Waldron suggests:
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 I argue that the important moral work in the story of the Good Samaritan 
is not done by any abstract cosmopolitan universalism—which is very easy 
to lampoon [...] but by the sheer particularity of the accidental conjunction 
in time and space of two concrete individuals [...] (Waldron 2011: 16)
So, accept refugees at your doors, organize decent life for them, prove 
that they are not the threat to ‘us’, and be generous in accepting them. 
Miller, however, has a warning against starting with samaritanism. 
He points to a wide range of psychological experiments that suggest 
that people are not good at helping suffering or threatened others even 
when the others are in their sight. In the chapter of his Justice for 
Earthlings entitled “Are they my poor: the problem of altruism in a 
world of strangers” he lists a series of depressing psychological experi-
ments, suggesting that people are bad in samaritan situation. Here is 
the most ironic of many testimonies recorded:
The experimenters witnessed on several occasions the bizarre spectacle of 
theology students hurrying to deliver a talk on the Good Samaritan and in 
the process literally stepping over a man who to all appearances had fallen 
in the street. Changing the cost of helping, in this case the cost of being a 
few minutes late to give a talk, transformed the subjects’ willingness to be 
altruistic. (Miller 2013: 190)
I would think that the psychological material just reinforces the point 
of the Biblical story of the Good Samaritan. In the story, the victim is 
ignored by a priest (hiereus tis, probably of Jewish faith, on his road to 
the Temple in Jerusalem) and by a Levite who were passing by, and 
then helped by our hero. The rate of ignoring is thus over 65%, and the 
psychologists would probably fi nd it realistic. The psychological point 
is not that everybody would help, but that more would help in presence 
than in absence, and that is all. The normative point is that urgency 
produces the duty to aid, and that the primary bearer of duty are per-
sons present in the situation.
So, why not start with the simplest potentially cosmopolitanism en-
gaging situation, the one of Samaritan help? 
3. A solution: Samaritan cosmopolitanism
3.1 The proposal: The Samaritan-to-deeper-measures model
Why bother? Well, because migrants might be dying in front of our 
eyes. In her book Ypi recounts the tragic story of Adonis Musati, a 
migrant from Zimbabwe, starved to death in Cape Town while queuing 
at the offi ces of South Africa’s home affairs refugee centre (Ypi 2012: 
107). We have lots of moral obligations to migrants that derive from 
the past, from their life circumstances and from their general human 
dignity. But, obligations come alive most clearly in the actual meeting 
with the likes of Musati. Waldron, who invented the samaritan ap-
proach in the ethics of international relations, rightly talks about “the 
sheer particularity of the accidental conjunction in time and space of 
two concrete individuals”:
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I argue that the important moral work in the story of the Good Samaritan 
is not done by any abstract cosmopolitan universalism—which is very easy 
to lampoon [...] but by the sheer particularity of the accidental conjunction 
in time and space of two concrete individuals [...].
Who is “we” in the concrete case of Rijeka, the place of our conference? 
On the one hand, the local community, but from a wider perspective, 
„we” is best construed starting from our supra-state framework, EU, 
and then proceeding to particular countries.4 
Who is primarily responsible for helping? We have been illustrating 
our proposal with the examples of individuals. But, of course, tradition-
ally the offi cial helper will be the nation-state, as Ypi rightly notes. 
And here there is a difference mostly multicultural vs. mostly mono-
cultural states (Canada vs. Germany (or Poland), and the former might 
be more ready helpers, as Kymlicka has been suggesting. The third 
way is to start above the state, and it is dramatically illustrated by 
the dilemmas concerning the role of the EU in the refugee drama. But 
we cannot enter these complications here. We shall just look at the 
dynamic of interaction.
Here, the immediate help comes fi rst, both normatively and caus-
ally; just accept the would-be refugees (indeed, the would-be refugees 
should be helped in leaving their countries and travelling to us). In 
longer term, staying should involve opportunity for work and training. 
Those who wish to stay in countries like Slovenia or Croatia, should be 
allowed to stay (and there should be a quota for each member-state of 
the EU, and perhaps wider). Distinguish at least three stages, fi rst, the 
immediate emergency (starvation, freezing, urgent medical problems) 
and catering to it, second, settlement and learning (on the host’s and 
the immigrant newcomer’s side), and third, the stage of (some kind of) 
citizenship, of relatively stable life in the host country. 
The differences between economic migrants and refugees exist, 
but there is a continuum of cases, and a large space in-between, that 
should tilt our decisions in favor of the needy. Let me say more about 
these samaritan stages of the trans-national engagement, even risking 
some small repetition.
Consider the problems of the fi rst stage. The immediate emergency 
is assumed psychologically to trigger the samaritan reaction, and nor-
4 We might need to take a wider look on samaritanism. It suggests a Proximitist 
Proposal: The density and the entanglement of interaction in a given location or 
territory is the crucial fi rst condition. Speaking about a suffering person, Waldron 
writes: “Never mind ethnicity, community, or traditional categories of neighborness. 
The fact that you are there makes you his neighbors” (Waldron 2011: 16). But how 
large is “there”? Once upon a time, with simple means of transportation it was the 
geographical openness that counted. To take the example of Hungary and south-
Slavonic countries, the Pannonian plain was the relevant “there”; in Central Asia 
it was the old Transoxiana, in particular Ferghana valley. Switzerland and its 
history illustrates openness for interaction in spite of intervening mountain ranges. 
Cultural proximity has been offering opportunities for interaction: smaller Slavonic 
peoples and Russia, the Muslim world from Morocco to Indonesia and the like.
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matively to command it. But can the process start at all? With great 
numbers of immigrants, and with unprepared host countries (see Žižek’s 
doubts below)? Present day Greece and Italy are offering the spectacu-
lar proof of practical possibility. Greece, an economically heavily bur-
dened country, is showing hospitality to something like fi fty thousand 
immigrants (almost a million have passed through the county since 
2015). Their life is still diffi cult, but they do survive, and are getting the 
necessary minimum. Since 2013, Italy took in over 700,000 migrants! 
(Turkey has taken more than three million of refugees but has not of-
fered them the minimum as we see it from our more Western perspec-
tive.) So, in this case, can implies ought, and the antecedent is fulfi lled.
At the second stage, once the migrant lives are not threatened, the 
ideological issues, re-education etc. steps in. Next, and much later come 
issues of “ideological disagreement” refugee culture should be accom-
modated as much as possible (in elements wether threaten elementary 
human not to rights)
At this second and third stage important changes hopefully take 
place. On the host’s side, the initial empathetic reaction connects the lo-
cal to the (once) distant strangers and to their society and culture: Had 
someone been helping Adonis Musati, Zimbabwe would become for him/
her “the country from which our Adonis came to us”. The host would 
learn in an empathetic, engaged way what the life is like there, how dif-
fi cult it is to survive, and so on. (To give a Croatian example, our tradi-
tion contains suffi ciently many multicultural features, most important-
ly the centuries long presence of Islam, that might serve as a bridge.)
On the immigrant citizen’s side, the welcome and the new way of life 
might produce positive changes. First, our immigrant, call her Saba, 
learns to appreciate the host country, say Croatia, and the community 
of Rijeka which has accepted her. Second, she might, after the experi-
ences of both suffering and welcome, develop a better understanding of 
compassion. And fi nally, she starts understanding how her new coun-
try fi ts the larger framework. Simon Keller sees the accomplished per-
spective as “the perspective of the worldly citizen” (Keller 2013: 250).
Now, this Samaritan obligation can function as a preparation for 
wider, classically cosmopolitan activity. Waldron would disagree; judg-
ing by her reaction in the discussion, Ypi might come closer to agreeing. 
Ypi presents the cosmopolitan setting as having to do primarily 
with distributive justice and equality. However, what she has to say in 
the book can be linked to the issues of peace (a condition of global dis-
tributive justice), to some degree of common governance, and probably 
to multiculturalism.
Of course, these wider issues linked to cosmopolitanism come in 
once we turn to causes of migration, at its sources. Take Bush-type 
war-provoking interventionism and the actual tragic profi le of the Mid-
dle East. The causes have to do with war, extreme poverty (look at 
Africa) and bad governance (e.g., in Mexico). What is needed, as we all 
know, is peace plus more: The decent government, some fairness in the 
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distribution, the respect of human rights. And only a more cosmopoli-
tan arrangement can guarantee this. We need measures signifi cantly 
deeper than samaritan hospitality; but fortunately, the later might be 
a preparation for the former.
Here is Kok-Chor Tanm or how:
[...] to rule out patriotic concern in the real world. What the limited patriotic 
thesis requires, when applied to the nonideal world in which justice is never 
fully realized, is that patriots ought also to take their duties of global justice 
seriously, and that they should be striving actively towards a more just 
world arrangement, if they want their practice of patriotic favoritism to be 
legitimate. They may show compatriots special concern, but they must also 
be sincerely attempting to minimize the background injustices by working 
towards a more egalitarian world. (Tan 2004: 161)
So, we have two theoretical steps, fi rst, accepting samaritanism and 
second, agreeing with general cosmopolitan ideology. Let us call this 
“Samaritan-to-deeper-measures model”. It hopefully offers a tentative 
answer to a more general question raised by Ypi, the issue of the need 
of two level playground:
Without cosmopolitanism at the level of principle, statist agency is morally 
indefensible. Without statism at the level of agency, cosmopolitan princi-
ples are politically ineffective and motivationally unsustainable. The avant-
garde is crucial to both principles and agency. (Ypi 2012: 179)
But how shall the two come together? Principles are not enough—we 
cannot do without some cosmopolitan activism. The Samaritan-to-
deeper-measures model offers an answer. It starts with host experi-
ence with refugees and vice versa, where the participants on each side 
become familiar with the other side and more sensitive (to what we, 
philosophers, would describe as cosmopolitan principles). The further 
cosmopolitan steps might, in the good case, lead to deliberative politi-
cal process in which the need for deeper measures will lead to more cos-
mopolitan proposals. (The simple, all-too-simple example is the rising 
awareness of EU administration that a lot of money should be spent on 
North-African countries in order to take care of the potential migrants 
there. The similar process is to be expected in relation to Middle East, 
once the perspective of peace becomes more realistic.)
So, activism (to turn to Ypi’s favorite topic) starts with refugees, 
the needy, in the vicinity; participants do the Good Samaritan part 
within the boundaries of state (or a state-like entity like the EU). The 
activity prompts cosmopolitan widening and the state deeper measures 
(search for peace, for more economic equality, for common supra-state 
governance) will naturally fi t into the new activist, more cosmopolitan 
framework. Let us locate this explicitly into framework proposed by 
Ypi. She talks about how a
[...] dialectical way of conceptualizing associative political relations com-
bines features of the civil society and family models and clarifi es the condi-
tions under which political agency would be effective, and the outcome of 
political actions would be motivationally sustainable. (Ypi 2012: 133)
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These features, according to her view, emphasize popular sovereignty 
and civic education.
Popular sovereignty, on the one hand, allows cosmopolitan interpretations 
to enter a deliberative political process, enabling the transformation of po-
litical institutions in accordance with their normative requirements. Civic 
education, on the other hand, complements this process by progressively in-
serting new normative commitments of cosmopolitan pre-existing cultural, 
political, and historical practices. Both, I suggest, are indispensable condi-
tions if we want global justice to be more than a cosmopolitan manifesto: 
popular sovereignty for global egalitarian principles to become politically 
effective in the fi rst place and civic education for them to be motivationally 
sustained. (Ypi 2012: 133)
The Samaritan-to-deeper-measures model offers both motivation for a 
political bite of cosmopolitan practices, and for the relevant civic educa-
tion. The topic of the latter brings us to our last question:
What is the wider, in particular second-order philosophical frame-
work for the model? My personal preference would be a contractualist 
one, in the wider sense, above all referring to Rawls and Scanlon. The 
theory of global justice goes well with it, and my preferred version of 
justifi cation would be the one of slightly idealized parties in the dis-
cussion (see Scanlon 2018). He requires that a proposed basic struc-
ture be justifi ed to all those who are asked to accept it and notes “that 
justifi cation must therefore appeal to the reasons individuals have for 
accepting such institutions based on how their lives would be affected” 
(Scanlon 2018: 157). He I talk about “the reasons that individuals have 
for accepting or objecting to institution” (Scanlon 2018: 157).5 This con-
tractualist framework is ideal, to my opinion, for specifying the general 
cosmopolitan principles. However, the question that is particularly rel-
evant here concerns the fi rst, Samaritan part of the model. Where does 
it fi t into second-order ethical-political theory? I would suggest that we 
look at the structure of the relevant contractualist justifi cation. Among 
the reasons individuals have for accepting the proposed institutions are 
self-centered ones. But we also need other-directed attitudes. If Ivana, 
the Croat, is to accept the idea that we, Croats, have an obligation to 
help Saba the Zimbabwean, she might need some empathy-sympathy.
Lacking such a morally fi tting sentiment, Ivana might simply re-
fuse to admit the obligation for Croats, in the manner made infamous 
in the right-wing populist discourse: “I just want to close my doors to 
Africans, no matter in which situation they are!” It is here that the 
samaritan considerations become important for the viability to contrac-
tualist justifi cation: The fi rst steps of contractualist reasoning might 
appeal to constructive, morally positive sentiments, and the empathy-
sympathy is the shining example of such a sentiment.
A purist Kantian Scanlonian might object that empathy is not need-
ed. We are free to appeal to idealization and postulate the idealization 
5 For a fi ne application to issues of global justice, see (Gilabert 2012).
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according to which Ivana is a moral person.6 But this is an unneces-
sary ad hoc measure, given that people are actually empathetic in the 
relevant situations, and we need as much psychological realism as pos-
sible: Do not idealize beyond necessity!
A particular episode of empathy is fi nally justifi ed at the general 
level of principle agreed upon in the contractualist procedure of justi-
fi cation in which a proposed basic structure is being made acceptable 
to all those who are asked to accept it. Pure contractualism specifi es 
for us the fi nal state of any particular piece of moral reasoning—the 
universal acceptance or somethning of the sort. It is relatively silent 
on the fi rst stage(s), but stresses perspective taking and explains how 
it makes one’s reaction more appropriate. The sentimentalist addition 
fi lls the void, and suggests how the later achievements are grounded in 
the initial ones.
Let me note that a similar dialectics seems to appear more general-
ly in the justifi cation of specifi cal attachements, national(ist), patriotic, 
purely cultural, or class-focused ones. Attachement is a sentiment, or 
a deep, standing disposition towards sentiment, and, according to my 
preferred account of moral-political justifi cation, this sentiment has to 
survive confrontation with other attitudes in a reasonable, open discus-
sion within the contractualist framework.
More needs to be said about the complications of Samaritan situa-
tion. So, let me return to the fi rst-order issue and say more, indeed, in 
a dialogue with my colleagues, in Rijeka and in Slovenia.
3.2 Objections and replies
Let me start with the actual discussion in Rijeka, with warm thanks to 
all participants. First, Chiara Raucea: “For the action you are recom-
mending, you need strangers at your doors. But many governments are 
engaged in preventing refugees, and migrants in general, to get to the 
doors at all. So, what are we to do in this case?”
If you need a name, call this “the Mexican wall problem” in honor of 
Trump and his bricklayer creativity.
Reply: We should distinguish two elements in our characterization of 
the “new playground”, with migrants moving to our countries, the fac-
tual and the normative element. To start with the latter, the duty to 
help remains even if the strangers are not literally at our doors; people 
on boats travelling towards our port are a case in point. In all the cases 
alluded to by Raucea, of strangers “close to our doors”, literally or meta-
phorically, we have the duty to engage in providing them the possibility 
to get to our doors. Americans should annihilate the Mexican wall. In 
the extreme Orbanesque case, where we are legally threatened if we try 
to help them, we have the duty to oppose the threat, in whatever way 
we can.
6 Ulrike Heuer came close to a general version of such a position in a discussion 
on the general issue of affect and reason in a Dubrovnik conference; I thank her a lot!
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The other element is psychological: People are more prone to help 
suffering others at their doorstep, than at a distance. Here, Raucea’s 
comment has a serious bite; the psychological ease of engagement and 
the natural rise of empathy-sympathy is blocked, and this is what Or-
ban and his executioners are counting with.
Zsolt Kapelner has articulated a similar worry: What about intol-
erant and xenophobic media that systematically keep the locals igno-
rant about the sufferings of the potential strangers-at-the-doors? What 
would be samaritan obligations in such a case? It’s the “communica-
tional Mexican wall”, if you like, to connect it with Raucea’s question.
Answer: I agree that ordinary citizens cannot do much here. But the 
situation is especially relevant for intellectuals: It is a task for us to act 
as public intellectuals, and write, blog, tweet and the like, about the 
burning issues covered by silence in the media. Internet is offering pos-
sibilities unimaginable two decades ago. And again, can implies ought, 
and produces a version of samaritan obligation especially demanding 
for us, intellectuals.
Eletra Repetto has articulated a worry often heard in potential 
host countries, in particular in Central Europe. Here, the local work-
ing class, including an army of jobless young and old people, is poor 
and needy enough, and the activists have enough work protecting its 
interests. How should we balance the interests of “our” needy with the 
interests of would be newcomers? Eletra’s question comes close to the 
“progressive dilemma” as formulated by Kymlicka:
In the postwar period, projects of social justice have often drawn upon ideas 
of national solidarity, calling upon shared national identities to mobilize 
support for the welfare state. Several commentators have argued that 
increasing immigration, and the multiculturalism policies it often gives 
rise to, weaken this sense of national solidarity. This creates a potential 
“progressive’s dilemma”, forcing a choice between solidarity and diversity. 
(Kymlicka 2015: 3)
Answer: As far as the immediate, fi rst stage of helping is concerned, the 
survival for immigrants is less costly than the normal life of the home 
needy. Take as example the medical help. In countries I know well, Cro-
atia, Slovenia and Hungary, the main debate concerns relatively costly 
medical interventions. In contrast, urgent medical help for refugees of-
ten concerns much more simple matters that are much cheaper.
Similarly, in Slovenia we have been massively collecting second-
hand, somewhat worn out warm garments, that were precious for the 
refugees freshly arrived from Middle East. In contrast, in the same 
country, the radical left is taking as a sign of abject poverty possible 
cases of local retired elderly people who have to wear second-hand worn 
out garments. I remember how shocked I was when I discovered how 
many people are doing it in a country I recently visited.
The dilemma gets much more serious with the issue of jobs and 
long term prosperity. Here, more sociological and economical research 
is needed, and I leave the issue open.
134 N. Miščević, Populists, Samaritans and Cosmopolitans
4. Conclusion: Cosmopolitanism in practice
The migration crisis has brought to the attention of wide public the 
issues connected with the right of immigrant refugees. What duties, 
if any, do we, members of third countries, have to such immigrants 
or would-be immigrants? There is a national responsibility to accept 
people in dire need, but how far does it go? Second, how should we treat 
cultural differences that become a central issue once the immigrants, 
in this case the asylum seekers, settle down?
At one end of the spectrum are authors like Slavoj Žižek (2016), who 
accept in principle the rights of asylum seekers, but demand from them 
total cultural integration, almost immediately.
Some authors, like Miller, claim that national responsibility to ac-
cept immigrant refugees is balanced by considerations of the interest 
of would-be immigrants and the interests that national communities 
have in maintaining control over their own composition and charac-
ter. In discussing outcome obligations to the poor, Miller reminds the 
reader of possible responsibilities of the “people in poor countries who 
support or acquiesce in regimes that reproduce poverty by siphoning 
off a large portion of GDP into military expenditure, presidential pal-
aces, and Swiss bank accounts”. The remedial responsibility should be 
focused on the responsibility of citizens of rich countries to ensure fair-
ness in cooperation, and to create an international order that would 
ensure opportunities to develop.
On the other end of the spectrum we have open multiculturalist op-
tion of widely opening the doors, and demanding minimum of integra-
tion. Our Samaritan-to-deeper-measures model fi nds its place at this 
end of spectrum. So, what would cosmopolitanism look like in actual 
practice in our world, marked by the rise of right-wing populism and 
refugee crisis?7 Our Samaritan-to-deeper-measures model suggests the 
following: The moral and political issues raised in this new context con-
cern fi rst and foremost the duties to “strangers at our doors” or at least 
“close to our doors” (literally or metaphorically), and these duties and 
the awareness of them are the fi rst step in a cosmopolitan but realistic 
direction. We have argued that the correct immediate cosmopolitan an-
swer to populist threat is the samaritan one: accept refugees, organize 
decent life for them, and prove that they are not the threat to “us”.
Thus Cosmopolitanism has to start now as “Samaritan” cosmo-
politanism, openness to and engagement for the close and present 
strangers. This can be done within one’s national state and it connects 
both the within-state activism and its cosmopolitan counterpart. The 
contrast is familiar from Ypi’s book, but is not as stark as we might 
fear. The initial empathetic reaction connects the local to the (once) 
7 See Nowicka and Rovisco (2009). It is concerned with cosmopolitanism “as a 
practice which is apparent in things that people do and say to positively engage with 
‘the otherness of the other’ and the oneness of the world” and with “cosmopolitanism 
as a moral ideal” (Nowicka and Rovisco 2009: 2) having to do, among other things, 
with “the possibility of a more just threat and the refugee crisis”.
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distant strangers. Once the present urgent problems are on the way 
to be solved, we should turn our attention to deeper causes of the cri-
sis. These causes are the evils traditionally discussed by cosmopolitan 
authors, from dramatic North-South inequalities, to exploitation and 
warmongering done by the richest countries. The initial Samaritan 
motivation naturally leads to attention to deeper issues, and toward a 
more ideal cosmopolitan considerations, both in theory and in practice.
At the second-order level, I have proposed a connection between the ini-
tial empathetic sentiment that is rational and fi tting in the circumstances 
of strangers-at-our-doors, and the subsequent process of reasoning, con-
tractualist process of justifying the cosmopolitan global-justice proposal to 
parties concerned. The Samaritan-to-deeper-measures model and its sen-
timentalist-plus-contractualist interpretation fi t well with Ypi’s engage-
ment with the principle/activism divide, and offers a way of understand-
ing, and hopefully, overcoming it. Its second-order counterpart, going from 
empathy to mutual justifi cation could offer a defi nitive understanding of 
the principles-activism connection, crucial for Ypi’s project.
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